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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION & DUE PROCESS-IS
THE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT ABANDONING JUDICIAL FEDERALISM?
I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial federalism is one of the most important and influential juri-
sprudential developments in modem times. It is the process by which state
courts may interpret their sovereign constitutions as protecting more indi-
vidual rights than are mandatorily guaranteed by the United States Constitu-
tion which allows for an increased "ceiling" of rights that offers more pro-
tection than is required by the federal "floor."' This has led many states to
adopt and continually use judicial federalism as an appropriate analytical
model for protecting their own citizens where the federal government has
failed to do so adequately.2 Not all states, however, are entirely consistent in
that adoption, nor in adhering to its principled use.3
This note will examine the history of judicial federalism by discussing
the history of its use, 4 as well as the analytical models that have been pro-
duced by its various adoptive jurisdictions.5 The development of these mod-
els has given courts much authority in determining the scope of individual
rights within their respective jurisdictions.6 Further, a discussion follows that
explores the criticisms directed at the use of such authority.7
This note will then examine the Arkansas Supreme Court's adoption
and use ofjudicial federalism as a necessary safeguard against governmental
infringements on individual rights, particularly those involving the right to
privacy.8 Although such cases initially focused on consent-to-search issues,
1. Robert K. Fitzpatrick, Note, Neither Icarus Nor Ostrich: State Constitutions As an
Independent Source ofIndividual Rights, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1833, 1842 (2004).
2. E.g., People v. Keta, 593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992) (holding administrative warrant-
less searches of vehicles unconstitutional under the New York Constitution); see Baker v.
City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970) (recognizing power and duty to find addition-
al constitutional protections in the Alaska Constitution); People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880
(Cal. 1972) (superseded by CAL. CONST. art. I § 27) (declaring the death penalty unconstitu-
tional under the California Constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment);
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (affording same-sex couples the right to the benefits
and privileges of marriage under the Vermont Constitution).
3. G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1097, 1114-15 (1997).
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. See infra Part II.C.
8. See infra Part II.D.
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they later extended to matters of intimate association. 9 Next, this note will
discuss Department of Health and Human Services v. Howard ("Howard
17"'),'° wherein affected individuals challenged the Arkansas prohibition on
homosexual foster parents." It will then explain how the Arkansas Supreme
Court did not apply its judicial federalism precedent to that case, despite the
appropriateness of doing so.' 2 The court's failure to utilize its precedented
jurisprudence puts the future of judicial federalism in question, and it places
thousands of Arkansans at risk of further rights restrictions. Therefore, this
note offers what would have been an appropriate judicial federalism analysis
of Howard I1,13 thereafter discussing the substantive result that could have
been achieved through adherence to Arkansas precedent. 14 Further, a com-
mentary is offered on the groups at risk after the Arkansas Supreme Court
failed to adhere to its precedent.' 5 Lastly, the note concludes with a proposal
that offers a remedy for the Arkansas Supreme Court's jurisprudential
lapse.'6
I1. BACKGROUND
State courts may rely upon declarations within their own constitutions
to offer rights not available under the United States Constitution. 7 This
judicial federalism recognizes that a state court has the power to interpret its
own sovereign and distinct constitution more expansively than the United
States Supreme Court interprets the federal Constitution. 8 Further, this
proactive use of state constitutions to provide a broader avenue of accessing
expansive rights has been called the most important modem development in
jurisprudence. 9
Judicial federalism offers several advantages.2" Foremost among them
is its functional purpose-to give state courts an analytical process by which
rights unavailable through the federal Constitution can be made available."'
9. See infra Part 1I.D.
10. No. 05-814, 2006 WL 1779467 (Ark. June 29, 2006).
11. See infra Part II.E.
12. See infra Part III.A.
13. See infra Part III.A.2.
14. See infra Part III.A.2.
15. See infra Part III.B-C.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. Tarr, supra note 3, at 1097.
18. Id. The popular title for this jurisprudential model began as the "New Judicial Fede-
ralism," but commentators agree that, after a quarter-century, "the [n]ew [j]udicial
[f]ederalism is no longer new at all." Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Looking Back at the
New Judicial Federalism's First Generation, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. xiii, xvii (1996).
19. Tarr, supra note 3, at 1112.
20. See infra Part II.
21. Williams, supra note 18, at xiii-xiv.
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Also, whereas federal courts are constrained by reconciling the competing
interests among its several sovereign jurisdictions, state courts may rule in
the interests of their citizens alone.2 Further, this freedom of interpretation
allows states to experiment with expanding rights, which may demonstrate
the desirability of a broader interpretation to the United States Supreme
Court if it decides an analogous issue.23 Finally, the localized effort of a
state supreme court to implement constitutional rights can be more practical-
ly managed through local authorities than through a broad, nationalized pro-
nouncement.24
Yet judicial federalism can only be used responsibly through under-
standing its extensive historical development. This section details the evolu-
tion and use of judicial federalism as a model of rights expansion through its
development at the national level, 5 the analytical variations that have been
produced through extensive use of judicial federalism, 26 the persistent criti-
cisms of its use,27 its eventual adoption by the Arkansas Supreme Court,28 as
well as the possibility of its abrupt abandonment by that court.29
A. The National Development of Judicial Federalism
Every state constitution included language intended to protect individ-
ual rights upon their respective adoptions.30 Each embodied a bill of rights
enumerating those protections that the state was willing to enforce, which
was typically more expansive than federal guarantees of rights.3 This was
necessary because the United States Supreme Court had originally held that
state actors did not have to abide by the federal Bill of Rights.32 Therefore,
22. Id. at xiii.
23. Id. at xiv.
24. Id. This is unsurprising because state constitutions create the legal frameworks that
govern most aspects of American life. Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and
Its Prospects, 28 N.M. L. REv. 271, 271 (1998).
25. See infra Part II.A.
26. See infra Part lI.B.
27. See infra Part II.C.
28. See infra Part II.D.
29. See infra Part II.E.
30. Ka Tina R. Hodge, Comment, Arkansas's Entry Into the Not-So-New Judicial Fede-
ralism, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 835, 840 (2003).
31. Rodriguez, supra note 24, at 274-75.
32. Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 1836. "In 1833, the Supreme Court held in Barron v.
City of Baltimore that the provisions of the federal Bill of Rights were inapplicable to the
states; thus, as against actions by state officials, state constitutions were generally the only
guarantors of individual rights .... Id.
2007]
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those seeking remedies to state restrictions on rights had to rely upon state
constitutions to seek protection in the absence of federal aid.33
These state constitutional rights became somewhat vestigial upon the
1868 ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provided a way for
the federal government to apply its Bill of Rights to the various states.34 Al-
though many citizens had feared a strong federal government at the birth of
the nation, the Civil War showed that the states could not always be trusted
as an additional guarantor of their rights.35 This caused many to welcome the
federal government's protection from states that had abdicated their duty of
protection.36 Thus, the United States Supreme Court began the slow process
of incorporating rights from the federal Bill of Rights to the states to imple-
ment this protection.37
Incorporation had a steady but immense impact on federal and state
constitutional law over the next one hundred years.38  The United States
Supreme Court, acknowledging that many states had abandoned their duty
to guarantee individual rights, applied the various provisions of the federal
Bill of Rights to the states on a case-by-case basis.39 This imposition of fed-
eral law replaced individual state constitutional interpretation with federal
interpretation and displaced state courts as additional protectors of individu-
al rights.40
The reasons for this displacement were two-fold: many state constitu-
tional guarantees of rights suddenly appeared to be redundant, as they mir-
33. Tarr, supra note 3, at 1099. Most political leaders preferred this vacuum after the
break from the tyrannous British Crown, believing that only a decentralized government
could ensure that individual rights were protected. Bonnie Johnson, Note, Arkansas Joins
Other States in a Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, Establish-
ing New Protections for Arkansas Gays and Lesbians, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 681,
687 (2003).
34. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Con-
stitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 537 (1986).
35. Id. Justice Brennan believed that this amendment embodied the "fundamental prom-
ises wrought by the blood of those who fought our War between the States." William J.
Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV.
489, 490 (1977).
36. Brennan, supra note 34, at 537.
37. Hodge, supra note 30, at 841. Although the immediate need for protective state
constitutions had been momentarily minimized, this ongoing exchange of civil liberties be-
tween the federal and state governments highlighted the importance of judicial federalism to
ensure some degree of uninterrupted rights protection. Ronald K. L. Collins & Peter J. Galie,
Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitutional Individu-
al Rights Decisions, 55 U. CiN. L. REv. 317, 317-18 (1986).
38. Collins & Galie, supra note 37, at 322.
39. See Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MicH. L. REv. 530, 539
(1989) (discussing federal courts' "fundamental distrust of state courts to protect federal
rights").
40. Collins & Galie, supra note 37, at 322.
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rored these newly applicable federal rights. Further, states were compelled
to deviate from their own precedent to abide by these newly applicable fed-
eral protections that would not have otherwise been adopted." Although a
majority of the provisions of the federal Bill of Rights were not extended to
the states until the 1960s, the profundity of incorporation affected virtually
every aspect of American life.42 These decisions owe much to the United
States Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren.43
The Warren Court was responsible for an unprecedented surge in rights pro-
tection, handing down such landmark decisions as Brown 14 and 1, 45 Mi-
randa v. Arizona,46 and Cooper v. Aaron.47 It was not long, however, before
the federal government retreated from this rights-expanding venture, thus
requiring the states to rediscover their proper roles as independent protectors
of individual rights.
In 1969, President Richard Nixon appointed Warren E. Burger as Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court in order to curtail the civil liber-
tarian gains of the previous Warren Court and usher in a new conservative
era.48 Chief Justice Burger wanted to move the Court "away from the atti-
tude that everything unwise or wicked is unconstitutional and that if we but
search, we will find some long-hidden meaning in [d]ue [p]rocess or [e]qual
[p]rotection or whatnot. ''49 Almost immediately, the Burger Court began to
construe individual rights more narrowly than ever before. ° Whereas state
courts were once needed to protect individual rights because the federal
government would not expansively protect rights, they were now needed to
stifle the efforts of a Court eager to expansively limit those same rights.5"
41. Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 1837. For example, Justice Harlan noted that a majority
of states had originally opposed rules requiring that criminals be advised of their constitu-
tional right against self-incrimination ("Miranda Rights"), and that "[n]o State in the country
ha[d] urged this Court to impose the newly announced rules, nor ha[d] any state chosen to go
nearly so far on its own." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
42. Brennan, supra note 35, at 493.
43. Robert L. Brown, From Earl Warren to Wendell Griffen: A Story of Judicial Intimi-
dation and Judicial Self-Restraint, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 1,2 (2005).
44. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that the "separate
but equal doctrine" violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
45. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (remanding to lower courts
to enter orders necessary to admit affected parties to public schools on a non-discriminatory
basis).
46. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that persons in police custody require procedural pro-
tections to safeguard privilege against self-incrimination prior to offering statements).
47. 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (holding that public schools in Little Rock, Arkansas must be
racially desegregated).
48. Williams, supra note 18, at xix.
49. Diane Marie Amann, International Law and Rehnquist-Era Reversals, 94 GEO. L. J.
1319, 1344 (2006).
50. See Brennan, supra note 35, at 495-98.
51. Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 1838.
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State courts wishing to prolong this period of civil libertarian gains thus
sought new ways to protect the advances made by the Warren Court.52
State courts were not alone in their desire to further increase these
gains. Justice William Brennan, a staunch supporter of the civil liberty ad-
vances achieved during his time with the Warren Court, made no secret of
his desire to see the states return to their roles as independent protectors of
individual rights.53 He authored a seminal article on judicial federalism that
inaugurated this new era of granting expansive rights.5 4 Justice Brennan
lauded this trend of rights expansion that had begun with incorporation and
urged that states continue it by interpreting their constitutions as providing
more protection than analogous federal provisions. 55 Justice Brennan noted
that numerous state courts were beginning to consider the merits of constitu-
tional arguments solely on their state's constitution in circumstances in
which they found federal interpretation offered inadequate protection. 6 Jus-
tice Brennan posited that this phenomenon "reflect[ed] a conclusion. . . that
there exists in modem America the necessity for protecting all of us from
arbitrary action by governments more powerful and more pervasive than any
in our ancestors' time."57 Justice Brennan believed this feature of federalism
was fundamentally necessary to protect individual rights from isolated and
systematic violations that had already been perpetuated by the United States
Supreme Court.58 Upon his pronouncement that the states' duty to provide
an additional and independent mode of protection was not satisfied by af-
fording only the minimal rights of the federal Constitution, the states were
thus left to devise their own analytical models to interpret their vital half of
federalism.59
52. G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional Interpretation, 22
RUTGERS'L.J. 841, 846 (1991).
53. Tarr, supra note 3, at 1097. This is not to imply that Justice Brennan denigrated the
utility of federal law. Rather, he felt that it was a vital part of federalism that "protect[ed] all
of us from the use of governmental powers in ways inconsistent with American conceptions
of human liberty." Brennan, supra note 35, at 490. Further, he emphasized that federalism
cannot function "when the federal half of that protection is crippled." Id. at 503.
54. Williams, supra note 18, at xiv. This article is "among the most frequently cited law
review articles of modem time." Id.
55. See Brennan, supra note 35, at 495.
56. Id. at 500. Indeed, state courts have published over 700 opinions stating that the
realities of state law are not sufficiently addressed by many federal interpretations of the Bill
of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment. Hodge, supra note 30, at 842.
57. Brennan, supra note 35, at 495.
58. Id. at 503. More troublesome to Justice Brennan was that these violations were car-
ried out "[u]nder the banner of the vague, undefined notions of equity, comity and federal-
ism." Id.
59. Id. at 491.
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B. Analytical Models for Applying Judicial Federalism Principles
Although federal constitutional guarantees of rights are binding on the
states, they represent only a national minimum or "federal floor" that may
not be decreased through state interpretation.60 With only this minimal
guideline, state courts are free to expand upon the protections that their re-
spective constitutions offer. 6' This section will discuss the two primary
models of judicial federalism: the Equivalence Model and the Non-
Equivalence Model.62 Each model is characterized primarily by its analytical
process, as well as the degree to which that process produces a result similar
to or different from federal interpretation of the United States Constitution.63
1. Equivalence Model
The Equivalence Model is a "lockstep analysis" that generally inter-
prets state constitutions as guaranteeing rights equivalent to analogous fed-
eral provisions.64 Despite state courts' ability to afford greater protection
through judicial federalism, many feel more comfortable with a lockstep
analysis that automatically presumes that the United States Supreme Court
has accurately and finitely established the definition and scope of necessary
individual rights.65 Advocates of the Equivalence Model justify this mirrored
approach on two key grounds: the similarity often found between state and
federal rights provisions requires respectful deference to federal interpreta-
tion; and, because state courts are a lower tier in the federalism hierarchy,
their role should be to interpret constitutional questions as the United States
Supreme Court hypothetically would in the same situation.66 Further, propo-
nents of this analytical model claim that it is the most advantageous because
it promotes uniformity among the states with federal interpretation and eases
the burden of those seeking to understand the scope and application of the
60. Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 1842.
61. Robert L. Brown, Expanded Rights Through State Law: The United States Supreme
Court Shows State Courts the Way, 4 J. APp. PRAC. & PROCESS 499, 502-03 (2002). Embol-
dened courts went so far as to claim that "Supreme Court precedent is only persuasive author-
ity to be scrutinized critically." Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 1845; see also Lincoln v. State,
285 Ark. 107, 110, 685 S.W.2d 166, 168 (1985) (Purtle, J., dissenting) ("I have never felt that
this court is bound by the opinions of the United States Supreme Court in matters where our
Constitution and laws are more protective of individual rights than are those of the United
States.").
62. See Collins & Galie, supra note 37, at 338.
63. See Part II.B infra.
64. Tarr, supra note 3, at 1116.
65. Collins & Galie, supra note 37, at 323. Although not pervasive, some states follow
this model to the extreme that state constitutional provisions should always be interpreted
identically as parallel federal provisions. Id.
66. Id. at 323-24.
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law.67 Therefore, equivalence interpretations of state constitutions vary little,
if at all, from federal interpretations of analogous provisions of the United
States Constitution.68
2. Non-Equivalence Model
Many courts prefer the Non-Equivalence Model and decline to utilize a
lockstep analysis with the federal interpretation of the United States Consti-
tution because of the difficulty it presents in granting more expansive indi-
vidual rights. 69 Non-Equivalence cases have had a widespread effect on state
constitutional interpretation in those areas in which the United States Su-
preme Court has refused to recognize or grant protection of individual
rights. 70 Under this system, state courts have a duty to provide authoritative
interpretation of their sovereign constitutions, which may not be abdicated
through blind uniformity with federal interpretation. 7' This provides a neces-
sary ceiling of protection for individual rights because it can guarantee pro-
tection when the federal floor is lacking.72
The Non-Equivalence Model operates by using an analytically sound
and independent analysis of the state's constitution based upon its text,
structure, and historical intent.73 Advocates of the Non-Equivalence Model
champion this alternate interpretive model because there are usually material
differences between the text and history of many state constitutional provi-
67. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 180 (1998).
68. Collins & Galie, supra note 37, at 324.
69. Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 1850. Some justices have not minced words in their
declination to use a lockstep analysis, believing that it is anathema to the very principles of
judicial federalism. Id. As an illustration:
[M]y colleagues have sunk this court to the lowest pitch of abject followership.
They no longer believe in our state constitution as an act of fundamental self-
government by the people of Louisiana. They no longer perceive this court to be
the final arbiter of the meaning of that constitution .... Instead, for them, our
state constitution is a blank parchment fit only as a copybook in which to record
the lessons on the history of the Common Law that flow from Justice Scalia's
pen.
State v. Tucker, 626 So.2d 707, 719 (La. 1993) (Dennis, J., dissenting).
70. Tarr, supra note 3, at 1118.
71. TARR, supra note 67, at 181. Further, state judges are obliged to rely upon their
state's constitution because of the oaths they take to uphold it. Tarr, supra note 52, at 845.
72. TARR, supra note 67, at 181. This is particularly relevant where the texts are very
dissimilar or in those instances where there is simply no analogue in the federal Constitution
for the right offered in the state constitution. Collins & Galie, supra note 37, at 328.
73. Collins & Galie, supra note 37, at 328. This is not to imply that justices invoking
this model are flawless in their attention to each individual factor; rather, some factors may
be only casually analyzed, even when state courts expand the rights available within their
constitutions beyond the federal boundaries. Id.
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sions and their analogous federal counterparts. 74 For example, state constitu-
tional provisions typically guarantee rights in affirmative language that can
more easily be expanded to protect individual rights, as opposed to the fed-
eral Constitution, in which rights provisions are couched in negative terms.75
But the importance of this duty suggests that an independent Non-
Equivalence analysis of the state constitution should be conducted even
where the relevant provisions are identical. 76 It must be emphasized, howev-
er, that this analytical process will not produce a result different from federal
interpretation simply because of a textual dissimilarity.77
C. Criticisms
The reactions to judicial federalism have been mixed.78 Although its
advocates assert that this more localized jurisprudence has brought much-
needed attention to state constitutions and that such experimentation with
offering greater rights can spur the United States Supreme Court to follow
suit, some critics remain unconvinced. 79 These critics typically disparage
this jurisprudence because of two possible consequences of judicial federal-
ism. 8
°
The first is a decrease in the public's faith in the courts' legitimacy or
credibility.81 Critics charge that because of the shortage of state precedents
on point, some courts engage in an "unprincipled, ideologically driven reac-
74. Robert F. Williams, A "Row of Shadows": Pennsylvania's Misguided Lockstep
Approach to its State Constitutional Equality Doctrine, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 343, 345-47
(1993). These material differences include their "respective histories, their political theories,
and the intra-state circumstances to which they respond." Rodriguez, supra note 24, at 272.
75. Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 1843-44. Compare ARK. CONST. OF 1874 art. II, § 6
("The liberty of the press shall forever remain inviolate. The free communication of thoughts
and opinions, is one of the invaluable rights of man; and all persons may freely write and
publish their sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such rights.") with
UNITED STATES CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press.").
76. Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 1844. "State constitutions are not, after all, subsets of
the federal Constitution; they are wholly independent documents serving as the charter for
governance within a state's borders." Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 1844.
77. Collins & Galie, supra note 37, at 328.
78. One proponent stated that "uncritical adoption of Supreme Court precedent as a
matter of state constitutional law is tantamount to conferring upon the Supreme Court the
functional ability to amend the state constitution, which the Court has no authority to do."
Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 1844. However, some critics are much more vociferous: "state
constitutional law today is a vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting, and essentially unintel-
ligible pronouncements .... [Its] discourse is impoverished and inadequate to the tasks that
any constitutional discourse is designed to accomplish." Williams, supra note 18, at xii.
79. Williams, supra note 18, at xxii.
80. See infra Part II.C.
81. TARR, supra note 67, at 185.
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tion to Supreme Court decisions with which [they] do not agree."82 This
precedent shortage is partially attributed to nationwide abandonment of state
constitutional interpretation during the Warren Court era.
83
The second possible outcome is a consequence of the first. As courts
have increasingly applied judicial federalism to state constitutions, average
citizens have responded with their own interpretations of what individual
rights should be extended to the people. 84 Unpopular opinions giving more
rights to politically disfavored groups have led to numerous campaigns to
amend state constitutions to curtail those newly afforded rights.85 This reac-
tive use of the political process has become increasingly common through
popular initiatives and referenda.86 Many critics, however, believe this ave-
nue of recourse is necessary as such state decisions are insulated from feder-
al intervention.87
These criticisms, however, merely emphasize the care that state courts
must use when utilizing a judicial federalism analysis.88 It provides an impe-
tus to state courts to use analytically sound methods when making their de-
cisions. 89 Nevertheless, state courts must ensure that these analyses stipulate
that they are being made in reliance on that state's constitution so as to
avoid reversal on federal grounds. 90 In fact, the requirement that state su-
82. Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 1847. Some allege, however, that this argument is in-
creasingly being made by political conservatives who are being forced to engage in rights
restrictions on multiple fronts instead of an otherwise one-state theater of war. See generally
Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet-Justice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional Law,
15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429 (1988) (proposing that courts only utilize judicial federalism
principles to achieve liberal results).
83. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutional Law, 90 MICH. L.
REv. 761, 780-84 (1992). Professor James A. Gardner believes that the resulting confusion
has created a "poverty of state constitutional discourse." Id. at 766; see also Rodriguez, supra
note 24, at 271 ("State constitutional theory remains a rather barren, mundane field, with little
substantive controversy, creative thinking, or paradigm-shaking.").
84. See Tarr, supra note 3, at 1099.
85. Id. at 1118. "The relative ease in amending state constitutions to overturn unpopular
state constitutional decisions reveals a fundamental paradox of state constitutional law: [s]tate
constitutions are, in theory, supposed to provide fundamental rights, yet those rights often can
be overridden by majority vote." Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 1854. This is to effectuate the
will of the legislature and voters to change political institutions, and not necessarily to align
the constitution with federal interpretation of the United States Constitution. Rodriguez,
supra note 24, at 277.
86. Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 1853. Chief Justice Burger, the judicial federalism critic
credited with inadvertently spurring its newfound interest, even advocated using the amend-
ment process as a direct counter to the enlargement of individual rights through state consti-
tutions. Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 639 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
87. Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 1862. The United States Supreme Court may not alter
holdings decided on independent and adequate state grounds. 1d. at 1862.
88. See Collins & Galie, supra note 37, at 323.
89. See id.
90. See id.
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preme courts must make a clear and plain statement of self-reliance on their
own constitutions has spurred some jurisdictions into adopting judicial fede-
ralism.9
D. Arkansas "Embraces" Judicial Federalism
The Arkansas Supreme Court has applied judicial federalism principles
several times in the past decade.92 The court has shown its willingness to
offer greater protections for individual rights under the Arkansas constitu-
tion than are offered under the United States Constitution by refraining from
a lockstep analysis with federal interpretation.93 This section examines the
Arkansas Supreme Court's preferred judicial federalism model, as well as its
application to various areas of the law in which the court has enlarged the
protection of individual rights beyond the federal minimum. 94
1. Equality Through Non-Equivalence
The Arkansas Supreme Court applies the Non-Equivalence Model of
judicial federalism when determining whether to grant greater protections
for individual rights under the Arkansas constitution than are available un-
der the United States Constitution.95 A particular nuance of the court's ana-
lyses has been to examine its traditional disposition on various cases and
whether or not that disposition has historically differed from federal inter-
pretation. 96 Although the use of judicial federalism displays the court's wil-
lingness to assert its own independent protection, this examination and par-
tial reliance upon past lockstep cases reveals the court's hesitancy to break
from precedent parallel to federal interpretation without a principled analy-
sis. 97 Despite this tension, the court's tacit adoption and explicit application
of the Non-Equivalence Model has provided abundant case law in a relative-
91. Hodge, supra note 30, at 858.
92. Id. at 851-59.
93. Id. at 858-59.
94. For a discussion of the federal minimum, see supra Part II.C.
95. Hodge, supra note 30, at 859. Although no opinion makes mention of this model, the
approach utilized in these cases is the same nonetheless. Id. at 860.
96. Polston v. State, 360 Ark. 317, 330, 201 S.W.3d 406, 413 (2005).
97. See Brown, supra note 61, at 505. "If we place too much reliance on federal
precedent, we will render the State rules a mere row of shadows; if we place too little, we will
render State practice incoherent." Id. (quoting State v. Bradberry, 522 A.2d 1380, 1389 (N.H.
1986) (Souter, J., concurring)).
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ly short amount of time, demonstrating the court's desire to protect individ-
ual rights.98
2. The Arkansas Supreme Court's Principled Application of Judicial
Federalism
In the past decade, the Arkansas Supreme Court has applied the metho-
dology of the Non-Equivalence model to numerous cases. These cases range
from examining the constitutionality of warrantless searches of homes to
analyzing the individual rights that must be afforded to homosexuals. 99
However, each case contains a central theme: that the right to privacy is
inherent in all bodies of Arkansas law and the utmost care must be taken to
protect that right. Yet the Arkansas Supreme Court's eagerness to provide
such additional protection for its own citizens did not begin until it was re-
buked by the highest court in the nation.100
a. Arkansas v. Sullivan
The United States Supreme Court decision in Arkansas v. Sullivan'
01
catalyzed the Arkansas Supreme Court's utilization of judicial federalism. 102
Kenneth Andrew Sullivan was arrested at a filling station in Arkansas after a
police officer discovered narcotics in his possession.103 Sullivan later argued
that the arresting officer's intent demonstrated that the arrest was pretextual-
ly tainted because he was initially questioned for a traffic violation, which
served as an excuse for searching him for drug paraphernalia.' 04 The Arkan-
sas Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the trial court's evidence suppres-
sion order, stating that the United States Supreme Court's precedent indicat-
ing that the subjective intent of police officers was irrelevant in this area was
98. Hodge, supra note 30, at 851. As this adoption has not always been explicit, it is
sometimes unclear when exactly the Arkansas Supreme Court is utilizing the principles of
judicial federalism. For example, litigation seeking equal access to monetary funds for public
schools has been one of the most substantial areas of judicial federalism nationwide. Wil-
liams, supra note 18, at xxv. Yet the court in Lake View School District No. 25 of Phillips
County v. Huckabee, Arkansas's leading case in this area, never discussed the issue of enlarg-
ing rights beyond the federal minimum despite the issue being raised at the trial court level.
See generally Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips County v. Huckabee, 351 Ark. 31, 91
S.W.3d 472 (2002).
99. See infra Part II.D.2.
100. Brown, supra note 61, at 501.
101. 532 U.S. 769, aff'd, 348 Ark. 647, 74 S.W.3d 215 (2002).
102. Brown, supra note 61, at 501; see also generally Robert F. Williams, The New Judi-
cial Federalism Takes Root in Arkansas, 58 ARK. L. REV. 883 (2006).
103. State v. Sullivan (Sullivan 1), 340 Ark. 315, 316, 11 S.W.3d 526, 526 (2000), over-
ruled by Arkansas v. Sullivan (Sullivan I1), 532 U.S. 769, 771 (2001).
104. Id. at 317,11 S.W.3d at 527.
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mere dicta." 5 Further, the court stated that it was free to interpret the United
States Constitution more broadly than the Supreme Court in order to provide
more rights.'06
On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, this decision was re-
versed as "flatly contrary to [the] Court's controlling precedent."' 1 7 The
Court noted that the Arkansas holding contradicted its binding precedent in
which it had refused to accept Fourth Amendment challenges based upon
the subjective intent of arresting officers. 0 8 Further, the Court reiterated that
no state court may interpret the United States Constitution more restrictively
than established federal precedent, but that "a State is free as a matter of its
own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this
Court holds to be necessary upon federal Constitutional standards."'0 9
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court expressly relied upon the Arkansas constitution and expanded
its available rights beyond the federal constitution to hold that pretextual
arrests are unconstitutional under Arkansas law."0 The court chose to break
its lockstep analysis with federal interpretation despite the near identity be-
tween the analogous federal and Arkansas provisions."' The court supported
this decision by noting that Arkansas courts traditionally have viewed pre-
textual arrests differently than their federal counterparts, as Arkansas case
law has consistently demonstrated a concern that police officers will abuse
their discretion in making arrests facilitated by pretextual conduct." 2 This
rebuke from the highest court of the land thus began a line of cases wherein
the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized individual rights not offered
through the United States Constitution. 13
105. Id. at 318, 11 S.W.3d at 528.
106. Id.
107. Sullivan I1, 532 U.S. 769, 771 (2001).
108. Id. at 771-72.
109. Id. at 772 (quoting Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975)) (emphasis in original).
110. State v. Sullivan (Sullivan II1), 348 Ark. 647, 649, 74 S.W.3d 215, 216 (2002); see
also Brown, supra note 61, at 501.
t11. Sullivan III, 348 Ark. at 651, 74 S.W.3d at 217-18.
112. Id.,74S.W.3dat218-20.
113. Brown, supra note 61, at 500.
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b. Griffin v. Arkansas
In Griffin v. Arkansas,"4 the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the
Arkansas constitution as granting more rights than the United States Consti-
tution in consent-to-search cases." 5 In Griffin, four police officers ap-
proached the suspect's home during night-time hours and knocked on his
door."16 Before anyone could respond, the officers began to search the home
until the homeowner discovered them." 7 Once detected, the officers ob-
tained his consent to the search, although they did not advise the suspect of
his right to refuse consent to the warrantless search."' The individual was
later arrested when the officers discovered drug paraphernalia within the
residence.'19 The court stated that it would depart from its previous lockstep
analysis in this regard as the federal interpretation did not sufficiently ad-
dress the needs of Arkansas citizens. 2'
In making its determination, the Griffin court examined this search and
seizure case under Arkansas law as expressed by its constitution, statutes,
and cases.' 2' Although the Griffin court noted the similarity between article
2, section 15 of the Arkansas constitution and the Fourth Amendment, it
stated that it possessed the authority to impose greater restrictions on police
activities in Arkansas based upon state law than those the United States Su-
preme Court held to be necessary under federal constitutional standards.'
The court reasoned that individuals must be given an opportunity to offer or
refuse consent before police officers conduct a warrantless search. 123 As
such a requirement was above the federal floor of requirements, the Griffin
court expanded the rights afforded by the Arkansas constitution and held
that warrantless searches conducted before obtaining consent violates the
Arkansas constitution.124 This holding diverged from federal interpretation,
114. 347 Ark. 788, 67 S.W.3d 582 (2002).
115. Id. at 792, 67 S.W.3d at 584. It is interesting to note that the court decided Griffin v.
State while Sullivan H was still pending on remand from the United States Supreme Court.
Williams, supra note 102, at 887.
116. Griffin, 347 Ark. at 796, 67 S.W.3d at 587.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 796-97, 67 S.W.3d at 587.
119. Id. at 797, 67 S.W.3d at 587.
120. Id. at 801, 67 S.W.3d at 591 (Brown, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 791-95,797-800,67 S.W.3d at 584-87, 588-90.
122. Griffin, 347 Ark. at 792, 67 S.W.3d at 585.
123. Id. at 799-800, 67 S.W.3d at 589-90.
124. Id. at 800, 67 S.W.3d at 590. The court acknowledged that a liberal interpretation of
federal law may have supported a similar finding but chose to base its decision solely on the
Arkansas Constitution to ensure the holding's viability on any future review. Brown, supra
note 61, at 510-11.
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even though the relevant constitutional provisions textually mirrored one
another. 125
c. State v. Brown
In State v. Brown,126 the Arkansas Supreme Court advanced its holding
in Griffin by further expanding the rights afforded by the Arkansas constitu-
tion. 2 7 Police officers received information that Jaye Brown was involved in
illegal drug activity. 2' The officers did not have a search warrant, but they
provided Brown with a consent-to-search form that would give the officers
permission to search her residence.129 The police officers did not advise
Brown that she had a right to refuse consent to search her home. 3 ° Upon
signing the form, the officers conducted a search of the residence that pro-
duced evidence of drug manufacturing and use. 13' The police officers ar-
rested Brown on the basis of this evidence, although Brown later alleged
they had conducted the search in violation of her privacy rights.' 32 The
Brown court agreed and established that the Arkansas constitution requires
police officers to notify a homeowner of her right to refuse consent to search
when utilizing the "knock and talk" procedure.'33
The Brown court began its Non-Equivalence Model analysis of the Ar-
kansas constitution by focusing on federal interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment.'34 The court noted that, although a warrantless entry into a
private home is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
this presumption may be overcome if a homeowner gives the police officer
his unequivocal, overt, and voluntary consent to conduct a warrantless
search. 35 The court noted that the Fourth Amendment requires, however,
voluntariness to be determined from the totality of the circumstances. 36 As
such, the court had heretofore consistently held that the "knock and talk"
procedure was not a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment.137
As with its previous rights-expanding cases, the Brown court proceeded
to emphasize that, although it lacked the authority to extend the protections
125. Griffin, 347 Ark. at 801, 67 S.W.3d at 591 (Brown, J., concurring).
126. 356 Ark. 460, 156 S.W.3d 722 (2004).
127. Id. at473, 156 S.W.3d at 731.
128. Id. at 463, 156 S.W.3d at 724.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 464, 156 S.W.3d at 725.
132. Brown, 356 Ark. at 464, 156 S.W.3d at 725.
133. Id. at 462, 156 S.W.3d at 724.
134. See id. at 466-67, 156 S.W.3d at 727.
135. Id. at 467-68, 156 S.W.3d at 727-28.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 468-69, 156 S.W.3d at 728.
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of the Fourth Amendment beyond the holdings of the United States Supreme
Court, it was not bound by that federal interpretation when interpreting state
law. 38 Although the Brown court emphasized that "a slavish following of
federal precedent would render [its] opinions merely a mirror image of fed-
eral jurisprudence," the court expressed concern that deviating too greatly
would lead to incoherent law within the state.'39 Nevertheless, the court con-
cluded that a break with federal precedent was warranted because of the
state's established history of protecting its citizens' privacy rights. 4 ' There-
fore, the Brown court increased the protections offered to Arkansans beyond
the federal minimum and held that police officers must advise individuals of
their right to refuse to consent to warrantless searches before one is com-
menced.' 4 ' As further credence to the advantages of judicial federalism, the
United States Supreme Court later adopted and expanded upon the reason-
ing of the Brown court and other courts in Hudson v. Michigan.'42
d. Rikard v. State
In Rikard v. State,143 the Arkansas Supreme Court refrained from ex-
panding its ruling in Griffin and held that a warrantless search of a garbage
container left outside of a citizen's residence does not violate privacy rights
guaranteed by the Arkansas constitution." Police officers had suspected
that Gwendolyn Rikard was both manufacturing and possessing metham-
phetamine 45 The officers conducted warrantless searches of her trash con-
tainers left near the curb of her residence and discovered drug paraphernalia
associated with methamphetamine production and use.'46 Rikard later ap-
pealed her conviction that was based upon this evidence, stating that the
search violated her right to privacy under the Arkansas constitution.'47 Al-
though the Rikard court conducted a judicial federalism analysis, it con-
cluded that the case did not warrant a departure from federal interpretation
of the United States Constitution because of the sufficiency of its protec-
tion. 141
138. Brown, 356 Ark. at 469-70, 156 S.W.3d at 728-29.
139. Id. at 470, 156 S.W.3d at 729.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 474, 156 S.W.3d at 732.
142. Cf generally Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006) (holding that violation of
the "knock and talk" procedure does not require a per se suppression of evidence).
143. Rikard v. State, 354 Ark. 345, 123 S.W.3d 114 (2003).
144. Id. at 354-55, 123 S.W.3dat 119-20.
145. Id. at 348, 123 S.W.3dat 115.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 353, 123 S.W.3dat 118.
148. See id. at 355, 123 S.W.3d at 119-20.
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In making its decision, the Rikard court first noted the implicit privacy
provisions under numerous provisions of Arkansas's constitution and its
statutory and case law.'49 The court also commented upon its holding in
Griffin, wherein it had relied upon Arkansas's rich tradition of protecting the
privacy of the home. 50 Lastly, the Rikard court noted its past decision to
examine the historical differences between federal and state interpretation
when conducting a judicial federalism analysis.15'
The court, however, declined to expand the rights afforded under the
Arkansas constitution beyond federal interpretation of the United States
Constitution.'52 The Rikard court noted the general symmetry between Ar-
kansas and federal law regarding the expectation of privacy for garbage left
outside the home for collection, stating that "[a] person who knowingly ex-
poses an object to the public cannot expect the protection from unreasonable
search and seizure" under the Arkansas or federal constitutions. 53 Because
Arkansas's interpretation of the issue had not varied in the past from federal
interpretation and because such interpretation sufficiently protected the pri-
vacy interests of Arkansas citizens, the Rikard court held that Arkansas citi-
zens can have no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding garbage left
outside of a residence.'54
e. Jegley v. Picado
In Jegley v. Picado,'55 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the state's
criminalization of sodomy violated Arkansans' rights to privacy and equal
protection, encompassing those rights under its own constitution.'56 Elena
Picado, along with six other gay and lesbian Arkansans, challenged Arkan-
sas's anti-sodomy law as unconstitutional. 5 7 The petitioners claimed that the
statute violated their fundamental right to privacy and right to equal protec-
tion under both the United States and Arkansas constitutions. 5 The Arkan-
149. Rikard, 354 Ark. at 354, 123 S.W.3d at 119.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 355, 123 S.W.3dat 119-20.
153. Id. at 354, 123 S.W.3d at 119.
154. Id. at 355, 123 S.W.3d at 119-20. While this case did not produce a result varying
from federal interpretation, it is still an appropriate example of judicial federalism because of
the analysis it employs. See supra Part II.B.2. See also Tarr, supra note 3, at 1116 (noting
that "state judges may base their rulings on state constitutional provisions but interpret them
as affording no greater protection" when conducting a judicial federalism analysis).
155. 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002).
156. Id. at 608, 80 S.W.3d at 334. This decision directly contradicted the United States
Supreme Court's then-existing precedent on the matter. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
157. Picado, 349 Ark. at 608-09, 80 S.W.3d at 334-35.
158. Id. at 608, 80 S.W.3d at 334.
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sas Supreme Court agreed and extended the protections of the Arkansas
constitution beyond its federal counterpart to protect the privacy and funda-
mental rights of its homosexual citizens. 59
The Picado court justified this break from Arkansas and federal
precedent on judicial federalism grounds. 16 ° The court engaged in a Non-
Equivalence Model analysis, comparing its constitution and the federal Con-
stitution to decide whether it should once again grant rights not recognized
by federal courts. 6 ' The court specifically noted Article II of the Arkansas
constitution, which "guarantees our citizens certain inherent and inalienable
rights, including the enjoyment of life and liberty and the pursuit of happi-
ness." '162 Most importantly, section 29 of that article states that "[t]he rights
enumerated in [the Arkansas] Constitution must not be construed in such a
way as to deny or disparage other rights retained by the people."' 63
The Picado court also examined other Arkansas law to determine
whether a break with federal precedent was warranted in order to recognize
a fundamental right to privacy.'" 4 The court noted that the legislature had
essentially already done so, as the Arkansas General Assembly had recog-
nized a right to privacy by enacting over eighty statutes designed to protect
those rights. 65 Further, the court acknowledged that it had declared that Ar-
kansas citizens have a general right to privacy. 66 This demonstrated to the
court that Arkansas had a "rich and compelling tradition of protecting indi-
vidual privacy" that necessitated finding a fundamental right to that privacy
in the Arkansas constitution. 167
The court conducted a similar analysis in determining whether to find
that the Arkansas anti-sodomy law violated Arkansans' right to equal pro-
tection. The court examined the Arkansas Equal Rights Amendment,
which prohibits the general assembly from granting any privileges that are
159. Id. at 638, 80 S.W.3d at 353-54.
160. See generally id., 80 S.W.3d 332. The Arkansas Supreme Court expressly "re-
ject[ed] Bowers v. Hardwick, in which the Supreme Court held that the right to privacy did
not protect private, consensual, noncommercial sexual behavior." Brown, supra note 61, at
516.
161. See generally Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332.
162. Id. at 627, 80 S.W.3d at 347.
163. Id., 80 S.W.3d at 346-47.
164. Id. at 629-31, 80 S.W.3d at 348-49. The United States Supreme Court has held that
some individual rights are so vital that they are "fundamental" and are thus inviolate, absent
some compelling governmental interest that is necessarily achieved through limiting the
fundamental right. ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
792 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 2006).
165. Picado, 349 Ark. at 628-31, 80 S.W.3d at 347-50.
166. Id. at 631, 80 S.W.3d at 349-50.
167. Id. at 631-32, 80 S.W.3d at 349-50.
168. Id. at 632-38, 80 S.W.3d at 350-54.
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not universally and equally granted to all Arkansas citizens. 169 Because the
general assembly had clearly granted privileges not universally available,
the Arkansas Supreme Court conducted a rational basis review of the anti-
sodomy law. 170 A statute is unconstitutional under this form of constitutional
review if it arbitrarily and capriciously discriminates against an identifiable
group without any relation to legitimate government objectives. 171 The court
held that the state's purported objective, to protect public morality, was
wholly illegitimate and inconsistent with the purpose of equal protection.
172
The Picado court explained that, as a countermajoritarian branch, it was
charged with the protection of politically unpopular groups who have been
injured by the imposition of the morals of the majority.7 7 As there was no
rational basis for the Arkansas General Assembly to criminalize sodomy
only between persons of the same sex and not between all Arkansans, the
court concluded that the statute was based upon "illegitimate disapproval,
biases, and stereotypes.' ' 174 Thus, the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized
homosexuals as a distinct and separate class entitled to protection under the
Arkansas constitution and struck down the anti-sodomy law on equal protec-
tion grounds. 175 As with the Brown decision, the United States Supreme
Court later adopted the reasoning of the Picado court and other courts in
Lawrence v. Texas.
1 76
Commentators agree that judicial federalism clearly influenced this
change in the United States Supreme Court's stance. 177 Among those effec-
tuating this sweeping change was the Arkansas Supreme Court, which "took
a stand against the use of maj oritarian moral standards to oppress politically
169. Id. at 632-33, 80 S.W.3d at 354-55.
170. Id. at 634-36, 80 S.W.3d at 350-52.
171. Picado, 349 Ark. at 636-38, 80 S.W.3d at 352-54.
172. Id. at 635, 80 S.W.3d at 352.
173. Id. at 638, 80 S.W.3d at 354-55.
174. Id. at 634, 80 S.W.3d at 351.
175. See id at 638, 80 S.W.3d at 353. In a congratulatory concurrence, Justice Brown
lauded the court's continued use of judicial federalism as a means to protect those beneath the
federal floor. See id. at 638, 80 S.W.3d at 354 (Brown, J., concurring). Justice Brown particu-
larly felt this result was necessary in Picado because the anti-sodomy statute was inconsistent
with "the bedrock principles of independence, freedom, happiness, and security" guaranteed
by the Arkansas constitution. See id.
176. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a fundamental right to privacy exists within the
United States Constitution, which encompasses noncommercial intimate relationships). For
example, judicial federalism may display the development and implementation of legal rules
that enhance the Supreme Court's understanding of the United States Constitution, such as
was seen in the period between Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas. Fitzpatrick,
supra note 1, at 1872.
177. Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 1872. The Court believed that the massive state-driven
trend towards decriminalization was "worthy of consideration in its federal due process anal-
ysis." Id. at 1855.
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disadvantaged groups."'78 This is not wholly surprising, as the subject of gay
rights is now the most frequently debated issue in judicial federalism, which
Arkansas appears to have embraced wholeheartedly.179 Further, Justice
Brown seemed to be fully aware of the impact the landmark decision could
have, noting that "the ripple effect of Picado may prove to be wide in-
deed."' 8° Justice Brown's prediction proved to be accurate, as a case filed
while Picado was pending would soon test the Arkansas Supreme Court's
adoption and continued use of judicial federalism.'
E. A Failed Test Case for Continuing Judicial Federalism in Arkansas
The Arkansas Supreme Court had another opportunity to further its
judicial federalism precedent in 2006 in Howard II,182 a case dealing with
the state's categorical exclusion of homosexuals from the foster parent ap-
plication process. 8 This section begins by examining the facts giving rise to
the eventual litigation and the circuit court's treatment of those facts, as it
was heavily relied upon by the Arkansas Supreme Court on appeal. 84 This
section continues with the Arkansas Supreme Court's opinion, as well as the
political reaction and consequences of that opinion.185
1. Facts
In January 1999, the Child Welfare Agency Review Board of Arkansas
(the "Board") approved a proposed regulation that would categorically ex-
clude homosexuals from serving as foster parents. 86 The Board, however,
allowed for a public comment period whereby individuals from the commu-
nity were invited to voice either support for or opposition to the proposed
regulation.8 7 Among those concerned about the adverse effects of a possible
178. Johnson, supra note 33, at 714.
179. Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 1855.
180. Brown, supra note 61, at 517. "This seems to have stimulated very important legal
literature, led by the groundbreaking article by Justice Robert Brown of the Arkansas Su-
preme Court." Williams, supra note 102, at 884-85.
181. Johnson, supra note 33, at 712.
182. No. 05-814, 2006 WL 1779467 (Ark. June 29, 2006).
183. See generally Howard II, No. 05-814,2006 WL 1779467.
184. See infra Part II.E. 1-2.a.
185. See infra Part II.E.2.b-3.
186. Howard v. Child Welfare Agency Review Bd., No. CV 1999-9881, 2004 WL
3154530, at *1 (Cir. Ct. Ark. Dec. 29, 2004) (Howardl) (mem.).
187. Homosexuals Out as Foster Parents, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, Feb. 26, 1999, at B2,
available at 1999 WLNR 4517833. A foster home, for the purposes of this regulation,
"means a private residence of one or more family members that receives from a child place-
ment agency any minor child who is unattended by a parent or guardian in order to provide
care, training, education, custody, or supervision on a twenty-four hour basis, not to include
[Vol. 30
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
regulation was Matthew Howard. 8' Howard, a homosexual minister expe-
rienced in outreach programs for the gay and lesbian community, testified
that such a categorical ban would be damaging not only to homosexuals, but
also to children in Arkansas who were in desperate need of foster care be-
cause of the already meager supply of people willing to serve as foster par-
ents.'89
Despite such testimony, on March 23, 1999, the Board enacted section
200.3.2 of its Minimum Licensing Standards ("Regulation"), which man-
dated that "homosexuals be excluded from the foster parent application
process."'1 90 Prior to the enactment, such excluded persons engaged in a
screening process identical to all other Arkansans, and no complaints had
been filed against a homosexual foster parent.' 9' The Board believed, how-
ever, that the enactment was necessary because several of its members were
concerned that placing a child under the care of a homosexual foster parent
would have an adverse effect upon the child's well-being.
192
adoptive homes." Howard 1, 2004 WL 3154530, at * 1. That enactment would make Arkansas
the first state in the nation to categorically exclude homosexuals from serving as foster par-
ents. Pre-Trial Brief of Plaintiff at 1-2, Howard I, No. CV99-9881, (Cir. Ct. Ark. Dec. 29,
2004).
188. Interview with Matthew Howard, in Little Rock, Ark. (Feb. 4, 2007).
189. Interview with Matthew Howard, in Little Rock, Ark. (Feb. 4, 2007). There are
approximately 3,000 children in Arkansas awaiting placement in a foster home. Mary Bissel,
Editorial, Ban on Gay Foster Parents Damaging to Children, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE,
May 9, 2004, at 8B.
190. Homosexuals Out as Foster Parents, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, Feb. 26, 1999, at B2.
A homosexual, for the purposes of the Regulation, was one who "voluntarily and knowingly
[engaged] in or [submitted] to any sexual contact involving the genitals of one person and the
mouth or anus of another person of the same gender, and who has engaged in such activity
after the foster home is approved or at a point in time that is reasonably close in time to the
filing of the application to be a foster parent." Howard II, No. 05-814, 2006 WL 1779467, at
* 1 (Ark. June 29, 2006). Legal characterization targeted towards homosexuals is not new in
Arkansas, which previously defined sodomy as the crime "called sometimes buggery, some-
times the offense against nature, and sometimes the horrible crime not fit to be named among
Christians, being a carnal copulation by human beings with each other against nature, or with
a beast," and "unnatural sexual relations between persons of the same sex, or with beasts, or
between persons of different sex, but in an unnatural manner." Johnson, supra note 33, at
699.
191. Supplemental Abstract and Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants, at SC2, Howard
II, No. 05-814 (Ark. June 29, 2006).
192. Supplemental Abstract and Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants, at SC2, Howard
II, No. 05-814 (Ark. June 29, 2006). This Regulation was passed despite the objections of the
agency's attorney, who argued that the Board's pre-existing regulations and screening
processes addressed any concerns related to the health, well-being, and safety of foster child-
ren in Arkansas. Supplemental Abstract and Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants, at SC2,
Howard II, No. 05-814 (Ark. June 29, 2006). See also Stipulated Facts of Defendants' Stipu-
lated Facts, HowardI, No. CV 1999-9881 (Cir. Ct. Ark. Dec. 29, 2004) (stipulating counsel's
advice to provide a rational basis for the rule other than attempting to "backdoor out people
who may be homosexual").
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Within a matter of weeks, Matthew Howard applied to become a foster
parent and was summarily denied because of his sexual orientation. 193 Along
with other similarly-situated applicants, he filed suit against the Department
of Human Services (the "Department") and the Board. 194 The petitioners
contended that the Regulation was unconstitutional under the United States
and Arkansas constitutions because it violated their right to equal protection,
their fundamental rights to privacy and intimate association, and the Separa-
tion of Powers Doctrine.
195
2. Procedural Posture
This section examines the judicial treatment of Howard's claims, both
the circuit court and on its eventual appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court.
The first subsection examines the lower court's opinion, particularly its dis-
cussion of the testimony proffered before it, as well as the court's substan-
tive analysis of the facts. The second subsection examines the Arkansas
Supreme Court's treatment of the facts, which did not address the substan-
tive issues raised at the circuit court.
a. Howard I
At the circuit court level, both petitioners and respondents produced
numerous witnesses who testified regarding homosexuals' fitness to serve as
foster parents. 96 The petitioners offered their own personal history and ex-
periences with the application process and also supplied the court with ex-
pert testimony from practitioners within the social sciences and medical
fields.'97 The petitioners' experts offered scientific research to demonstrate
that homosexuals are as mentally and physically fit to serve as foster parents
as heterosexuals and that an applicant's sexual orientation should not be
considered in foster care placement.' 98 Dr. Cheralyn Powers testified that
193. Interview with Matthew Howard, in Little Rock, Ark. (Feb. 4, 2007).
194. Howard II, 2006 WL 1779467, at * 1. The personal histories of the additional peti-
tioners represented the diverse array of people affected by the Regulation's broad exclusion:
Craig Stoopes is an employee of the public library in Little Rock and is in a long-term rela-
tionship with Matthew Howard; Anne Shelley is a lesbian who serves as the director of a gay
and lesbian advocacy group; and William Wagner is a heterosexual who, along with his wife,
has cared for over eighty non-custodial children, but who could not serve as a foster parent
because his eighteen-year-old son (who is a homosexual) lives in Wagner's home. Howard I,
2004 WL 3154530, at *2. See also Interview with Matthew Howard, in Little Rock, Ark.
(Feb. 4, 2007).
195. HowardI, 2004 WL 3154530, at *1.
196. Id. at *2-7.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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there is no correlation between the sexual orientation or gender of a parent
and the healthy development of a child. 99 Dr. Frederick Berlin testified that
homosexuality is not a mental disorder, that it is likely impossible for a per-
son to change their sexual orientation, and that it would be unethical to at-
tempt to have someone do SO. 2 ' Dr. Susan Cochran testified that homosex-
uality is not a predictor of whether or not a person is more likely to abuse or
become dependent upon drugs or alcohol.20' Professor Judith Faust testified
that foster child placement should be based upon individual evaluations.2 °2
Dr. Pepper Schwartz testified that there was no statistically significant dif-
ference between quality and durability of same-sex and different-sex rela-
tionships and that many homosexuals enjoyed a higher quality of relation-
ships than heterosexuals.2 3 Dr. Rebecca Martin stated that the application
process existing before the Regulation adequately tested for the Human Im-
munodeficiency Virus (HIV), the transmission of which is commonly asso-
ciated with sexual contact between homosexuals .2 ' Dr. Michael Lamb testi-
fied that being raised by gay parents does not cause any social, mental, be-
havioral, relational, scholastic, or sexual adjustment problems whatsoever.2 5
In contrast, the circuit court noted that the opinions offered by the res-
pondents' witnesses focused on personal views of public morality and the
detrimental effects that exposure to a homosexual could possibly have upon
the upbringing of a child.206 The respondents first introduced testimony from
members of the Board, who described their personal animus towards homo-
sexuality as their reason for enacting the Regulation.20 7 Robin Woodruff
stated that she proposed the Regulation to the Board because she believes
that homosexuality goes against Biblical doctrine.2A5 Woodfruff also testified
that she believed that the Board should address her belief through a categor-
ical ban that excluded homosexuals.20 9 James Balcom stated that morality
and religious beliefs primarily guided his decision to vote for the Regulation
199. Id. at *3-4. Dr. Powers is a clinical psychologist. Id.
200. Id. at *6. Dr. Berlin is a psychiatrist and expert on sexual abuse. Id.
201. Howard I, 2004 WL 3154530, at *7. Dr. Cochran is a clinical psychologist and
epidemiologist. Id.
202. Id. at *4-5. Professor Faust teaches at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock
School of Social Work. Id. Professor Faust further testified that the chief professional organi-
zation that guides child welfare practices in the country is the Child Welfare League of
America (of which the respondent is a member), and it has issued standards stating that foster
parent applicants should not be denied solely because they are homosexual. Id. at *5.
203. Id. at *7. Dr. Schwartz is a sociologist. Id.
204. Id. at *4. Dr. Martin is a medical doctor and expert on infectious disease. Id.
205. Id. at *5-6. Dr. Lamb is a psychologist, whom the court described as "the most
outstanding of the expert witnesses." Id.
206. Id. at *2-3, 6, 8.
207. HowardI, 2004 WL 3154530, at *2-3.
208. See id. at *2.
209. Id.
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and that homosexuality is a choice encouraged through active recruitment
by "gay militants."21 The respondents then offered testimony from their sole
expert witness, Dr. George Rekers, who testified that any household that
includes a homosexual cannot adequately address the needs and best inter-
ests of a foster child.2t'
After evaluating the differences in the litigants' expert testimony, the
circuit court first addressed whether the regulation was a violation of the
Separation of Powers Doctrine.212 The court noted that the Arkansas General
Assembly had delegated its power to the Board in order to promote the
health, safety, and welfare of children through the promulgation of rules that
would achieve that goal.21 3 The circuit court found, however, that the testi-
mony and evidence brought before it unequivocally demonstrated that there
was no logical relationship between the regulation and the general well-
being of foster children and that any contrary evidence was based upon per-
sonal conviction without scientific foundation.214 The court was careful to
emphasize that the Board's intent-to legislate public morality-was in fact
a legitimate state interest.21 5 Yet the court ruled that the regulation violated
the state constitution because the general assembly delegated the ability to
legislate regarding matters relating to a foster child's health, but not the im-
pact of the perceived public morality on that child.216 The circuit court found
that the Board violated the Separation of Powers Doctrine because it un-
constitutionally assumed a regulatory power beyond the scope of its authori-
ty. 2 17
210. Id. at *3.
211. Id. at *6. The circuit court took particular issue with this expert, Dr. George Rekers,
so much so that Justice Fox devoted a portion of his opinion to admonish him for prioritizing
his own personal agenda against homosexuality and undermining any assistance he might
have otherwise been to the court. Howard 1, 2004 WL 3154530, at *8. The State, however,
countered that its expert witness, who is also a Southern Baptist minister, did not inject his
personal views into his testimony after he acknowledged his reliance upon the Bible as the
infallible word of God. Gay Foster Parents Hurt, Witness Says-But Opponents Allege Bias
in Professor's Trial Statements, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, Oct. 6, 2004, at B3. The State later
refused to pay Dr. Rekers the "exorbitant" $200,000 he billed the Department for his testi-
mony, whose representatives later admitted he had not been an expert on the issue of whether
homosexuals may serve as fit parents. Charlotte Tubbs, Agency, Witness Tangling over Pay,
ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZET-rE, Dec. 30, 2006.
212. Howard 1, 2004 WL 3154530, at *9. The court offered this brief explanation from
Federal Express Corporation v. Skelton, 265 Ark. 187, 578 S.W.2d 1 (1979): "Each branch
[of government] has certain specified powers delegated to it," and one branch of government
may not assume the roles or duties of another branch. Howard I, 2004 WL 3154530, at *9.
213. Id. at *9.
214. Id..
215. Id. (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)).
216. Id.
217. Id. Beyond its violation of the Arkansas constitution, the circuit court found that the
expert testimony clearly indicated that the Regulation violated another of the Board's regula-
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Next, the circuit court addressed the plaintiffs claim under the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.2 18 The court stated that
homosexuals are not recognized as a protected or "suspect" class and are
therefore only entitled to a rational basis standard, the lowest form of consti-
tutional review. 219 The court explained that, under rational basis, equal pro-
tection is violated only if there is evident discrimination without a legitimate
governmental justification or one that does not bear a rational relationship to
the discrimination. 220 First, the circuit court stated that there was blatant dis-
crimination because otherwise-qualified persons were wholly excluded from
serving as foster parents.22' Yet the court also identified a legitimate state
interest because all states have the duty to protect children.222 The court po-
sited that the more difficult question was whether there was a rational rela-
tionship between the discrimination and the duty to protect.223 The court
ultimately found that a supposed public morality served as the nexus be-
tween the two, stating that the blanket exclusion could further the public
morality despite not furthering the interests of a foster child.224
In regards to the petitioners' final claim-that the regulation violated
their fundamental rights to privacy and intimate association-the circuit
court adopted the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Lof-
ton v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family Services, 225 and
rejected the petitioners' contention.226 The petitioners in Lofton challenged a
tory duties, to "select the home that is in the best interest of the child ... based on an individ-
ual assessment of the child's needs." Howard1, 2004 WL 3154530, at *9-10. Kathy Hall, the
State's lead counsel, suggested that the Regulation could thus withstand judicial scrutiny if
the General Assembly delegated the power to the Board to regulate morality and its effect
upon foster children. David Hammer, Arkansas to Appeal Gay Parent Ruling, HOUSTON
CHRON., Dec. 31, 2004, at A9.
218. Howardl, 2004 WL 3154530, at *10.
219. Id. at *10-11. The circuit court continued to examine the constitutional issues
beyond its Separation of Powers Doctrine analysis because it believed that the particularly
vulnerable nature of the foster children at issue required that a probable appellate review
would need to be able to consider the full extent of all constitutional issues initially raised. Id.
at *12.
220. Id. at *10.
221. Id.
222. Id. (citing Palmore v. Sidotti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)).
223. Id.
224. Howard 1, 2004 WL 3154530, at *11. Justice Timothy Davis Fox dismissed the
petitioner's claims that a public morality that is prejudicial to a group cannot be a legitimate
goal by relying upon the dissent in Romer v. Evans. Howard I, 2004 WL 3154530, at *12
(citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (countering homosexuals
through democratic legislation is permissible)).
225. 358 F.3d 804 (1lth Cir. 2004).
226. HowardI, 2004 WL 3154530, at *12.
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statute excluding homosexuals from the Florida adoption process.227 The
Eleventh Circuit held that there was no precedent to support the appellants'
claims that the ability to serve as a foster parent was constitutionally pro-
tected. 28 Further, the Lofton court held that there was no equal protection
violation because the disparate treatment of heterosexuals and homosexuals
by the State of Florida, while imperfect, was not significant enough to war-
rant a constitutional violation.229
The circuit court entered judgment in favor of the petitioners on their
separation of powers argument and found the Regulation unconstitutional.23 °
The state issued a statement one day after the judgment announcing that it
would appeal the "erroneous ruling."23'
b. Howard II
Justice Donald L. Corbin delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court
of Arkansas in Howard H on June 29, 2006, which affirmed the lower
court's holding that the Department unconstitutionally violated the Separa-
tion of Powers Doctrine by excluding homosexuals from the foster parent
application process.232 Justice Robert L. Brown wrote a concurring opinion
addressing the additional constitutional issues discussed by the circuit court,
though not by the majority.233
i. Majority opinion
On direct appeal from the circuit court, the Howard II majority ad-
dressed the single issue of whether the appellant agency had unconstitution-
227. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 811 (Barkett, J., dissenting). Similarly to the Regulation, Lofton
involved a statute that treated homosexuals less favorably than child molesters, drug addicts,
and domestic abusers, who were not categorically excluded from the adoption process. See id.
at n.18.
228. Id. at 811.
229. See generally id.
230. Howard I, 2004 WL 3154530, at *13. The circuit court concluded with a comment
about the general role of the courts: it warned that, although it was inevitable for the legisla-
ture, as the promulgator of the majority's public policy, to clash with the judiciary, which is
charged with preventing a "tyranny of the majority," it advised that the best way to absolve
such conflict was through information and not assumption. Id. It stated that those truly inter-
ested in promoting the best interests of foster children in Arkansas should examine the expert
opinions assembled herein to ensure that the morality of today does not become the regretted
bigotry of the past. Id.
231. David Hammer, Arkansas to Appeal Gay Parent Ruling, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 3 1,
2004, at A9.
232. Howardll, No. 05-814, 2006 WL 1779467, at *1. (Ark. June 29, 2006).
233. Id. at *7. (Brown, J., concurring).
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ally regulated beyond its delegated powers.3 In order to render its decision,
the majority analyzed the constitutionality of the Regulation by examining
the relationship between the exclusion and the statute's construction, the
statutory delegation of authority given to the Department by the Arkansas
General Assembly, as well as the expert testimony delivered before the cir-
cuit court.2 35
The Arkansas Supreme Court's analysis began with an examination of
the legislature's delegation of authority to the Board.236 Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Corbin wrote that the essential authority and goal of the Board
was to disseminate rules that would improve the health, safety, and welfare
of children.237 As such, his analysis examined whether the Regulation and its
impact was confined to those set parameters.
Justice Corbin began by explicating the court's limited standard of re-
view when determining a regulation's validity, particularly emphasizing that
no administrative agency has the authority to enact rules not in accordance
with other law.238 Justice Corbin primarily relied upon the testimony prof-
fered to the circuit court to determine whether the Regulation could be re-
conciled with the Separation of Powers Doctrine by promoting the health,
safety, and welfare of children.2 39 Just as the circuit court before it, the ma-
jority concluded that there was no correlation between the Regulation and
the Board's purported goal of furthering the well being of children.240 The
majority went on to discuss the cause of this unauthorized act, finding the
Board's personal biases and view on morality at its source.24 ' Because the
general assembly did not legislatively permit the Board to do so, the court
234. Id. at *6-7. The majority also addressed appellants' claims that the court did not
have jurisdiction over the matter. Id. at * 1. Although these issues were not raised at the trial
level, the Arkansas Supreme Court was obligated to review them per its decision in Arkansas
Department of Human Services v. Isbell, 360 Ark. 256, 200 S.W.3d 873 (2005) (raising sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction is appropriate at any time). The court dismissed as frivolous the ap-
pellants' claim that none of the appellees had standing before the court because they had not
applied to become foster parents, as the appellees had in fact applied and were summarily
denied as a result of the regulation. Howard II, 2006 WL 1779467, at *2. The appellants
further argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter because the appellees had
not exhausted every available remedy at the administrative level. Id. at *2-3. However, the
Arkansas Supreme Court found the rule that inadequate or futile remedies need not be sought
was applicable to the appellants, stating that the blanket exclusion of their class of persons
precluded the need to adjudicate the matter before a hostile administration. Id. at *3.
235. Id. at *3-5.
236. Id. at*3.
237. Id. at*3.
238. Id. at *4. Justice Corbin also noted that such a regulation may be found invalid if
arbitrary, capricious, or enacted through an abuse of discretion. Id.
239. Id. at *4-5.
240. HowardII, 2006 WL 1779467, at *6.
241. Id.
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held that it had stepped beyond its delegated authority by regulating public
morality and its effect upon children.242
Through this analysis, the court affirmed the circuit court's holding that
the Board unconstitutionally violated the Separation of Powers Doctrine by
usurping the general assembly's power to regulate public morality. The
court declined to address the cross-appellants' arguments, such as whether
the regulation violated their rights under the equal protection provisions of
the Arkansas and United States constitutions or their fundamental rights to
privacy and intimate association.
ii. Concurring opinion
Justice Brown agreed with the majority's holding that the Regulation
violated the Separation of Powers Doctrine, but argued that the court should
have addressed all of the constitutional issues discussed by the circuit
court.243 Justice Brown examined the regulation through an equal protection
and privacy rights analysis, guided by Arkansas precedent.2 " His analysis
concluded that the individual rights of the cross-appellants had been vi-
olated, and therefore he would have overruled the circuit court on equal pro-
tection and due process grounds.245
Justice Brown began by detailing the effects of the Regulation on the
privacy rights of homosexuals. 2 6 He opined that the Regulation clearly and
substantially had an adverse effect upon an individual's right to privacy in
direct contravention to established precedent on the matter.247 He stated that
this burden manifested as an infirmity resulting from the denial of an oppor-
tunity to serve as foster parents for the thousands of neglected children in
Arkansas.248 Consequently, Justice Brown stated that it is those children who
must also bear the loss of that burden by being forced to live as wards of the
state.
249
Justice Brown then expressed his concern that the Child Welfare Agen-
cy Review Board also disregarded precedent established by the United
States Supreme Court when it enacted the regulation solely out of moral
disapproval.25 0 He noted that the Supreme Court had clearly established the
inadequacy of such a justification for delimiting equal protection of privacy
242. Id.
243. Id. at *7 (Brown, J., concurring).
244. Howard I, 2006 WL 1779467, at *8.
245. Id. at *7-8.
246. Id. at *8.
247. Id. (citing Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002)).
248. Id.
249. Id. at *7 (Brown, J., concurring).
250. Howard I, 2006 WL 1779467, at *9.
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rights. 51 Further, he reiterated the Court's declaration that personal deci-
sions relating to the private intimacies of interpersonal relationships cannot
likewise be hindered by the government.252
Justice Brown concluded by admonishing the Board for its prejudiced
regulation. 253 He believed that the constitutionally guaranteed rights of ho-
mosexuals had been unequivocally diminished by the actions of the gov-
ernment, and no permissible reason existed to justify it.254 For these reasons,
Justice Brown concurred with the view of the majority but expressed belief
that the Regulation should have also been found unconstitutional as a viola-
tion of the cross-appellants' right to equal protection and fundamental right
215to privacy.
3. Political Reactions
The political reaction to Howard II was immediate and hostile, as polit-
ical candidates who were courting voters for the upcoming election con-
demned the court's decision in near-universal solidarity.256 Both of the front-
running gubernatorial candidates quickly stated their support for a future
legislative ban on homosexual foster parents.257 Mike Huckabee, the state's
then-governor and 2008 presidential candidate, wholly opposed the outcome
and promised that a "solution" would be found.258 Both the Speaker of the
House-designate and Senate Pro Tempore-designate for the 2007 legislative
session announced their support for any such "solution. 2 59 Jim Holt, the
Republican candidate for Lieutenant Governor, lamented that the "[Arkan-
sas] Supreme Court [has] run over the will of the people.
26 °
Yet, the will of the Arkansas people did not wholly parallel the politi-
cal clamor. Numerous editorials and articles appeared in Arkansas's news-
papers espousing support for the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision, how-
251. Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) ("[I]f the constitutional
conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean
that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.")).
252. Id. at *8 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at *7-8 (Brown, J., concurring).
256. See Jake Bleed & Charlotte Tubbs, Legislation is Seen Rising from Ruling on Gays
Giving Care, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, July 1, 2006.
257. Bleed & Tubbs, supra note 256. Mike Beebe, the current governor, would now only
support such a ban if it is constitutionally written. Id.
258. John Brummett, Getting the Gays, Quietly, ARK. TIMES, July 13, 2006.
259. Bleed & Tubbs, supra note 256.
260. Id. Bill Halter, the successful Democratic candidate for Lieutenant Governor, offered
the solitary hope that no one "try to use this for any sort of political gain." Id.
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ever limited its protective effect may have been."' Further, a study con-
ducted by the University of Arkansas revealed an interesting contradiction
within Arkansans' voting practices.262 The study found that although a ma-
jority of Arkansans personally disapprove of homosexual foster parenting,
they are evenly split on whether a legislative ban should give effect to that
personal opinion.263 Regardless of that split, some of those victorious candi-
dates attempted to make good on their campaign promises.
On March 5, 2007, Senator Shawn Womack filed Senate Bill 9 5 9 264
with the Arkansas General Assembly, entitled "An Act To Protect the Child-
ren Who Are Most Vulnerable by Clarifying the Public Policy of the State
of Arkansas Regarding the Placement of Children with an Adoptive or Fos-
ter Parent [and] to Authorize the Department of Health and Human Services
to Promulgate Rules and Regulations., ' 265 The bill not only prohibited all
Arkansas homosexuals from serving as foster parents but also excluded
them from adopting a child even if related by blood.266 Further, these exclu-
sions were extended to all persons "residing with another person and being
involved in a sexual relationship with that person. 2 67 Last, it contained an
emergency clause with a public policy provision:
[I]t is the public policy of the State of Arkansas to prohibit a homosexual
adult from becoming an adoptive or foster parent, and that this act is
immediately necessary to protect the children who are most vulnerable
by clarifying the public policy of the state regarding the placement of
children with an adoptive or foster parent. Therefore, an emergency is
261. See Paul Greenberg, Editorial, Gay or Straight, Just Find the Best Parents, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, June 22, 2006; see also Ernest Dumas, Law Trumps Bigotry, ARK.
TIMES, July 6, 2006; see also Kane Webb, Editorial, Mike Beebe's Stonewall, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, July 16, 2006.
262. Press Release, University of Arkansas, Arkansas Poll Probes Election, Beyond (Oct.
26, 2006).
263. See Press Release, University of Arkansas, supra note 262. The researchers partially
attributed this result to a libertarian ideal held by many Arkansans. See id. But this libertarian
ideal has obvious limits, as Arkansas voters had recently passed an amendment to the Arkan-
sas constitution defining marriage as "the union of one man and one woman." ARK. CONST.
amend. LXXXIIL, § 1.
264. S. 959, 86th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2007).
265. Id. Proponent Senator Dave Bisbee, R-Rogers, explained that it was necessary for
the legislature to take action due to the "failure of society." Laura Kellams, Senate OK's
Banning Foster Care, Adoption by State 's Homosexuals, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETIE, Mar.
14, 2007.
266. S.959, 86th Gen. Assem., Reg-Sess. (Ark. 2007).
267. Id. An exception was made for such "cohabiting" individuals, however, if the child
in question was a sibling, step-child, grandchild, great-grandchild, or otherwise related by
blood or marriage. Id.
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declared to exist [with] this act being immediately necessary for the pre-
servation of the public peace, health, and safety.... 26 8
Senator Womack stated that the Arkansas Supreme Court was very clear as
to why the Regulation had been overturned and that "they said it was our job
to set the policy.
269
The bill met with vigorous debate on both sides of the issue. Opponents
of the bill spoke out against its passage: Terri M. Beiner, a constitutional
law professor at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, testified that the
government's legitimate interest in protecting children was not advanced by
a blanket exclusion of homosexuals; Senator Jim Argue also explained the
numerous problematic privacy concerns that the bill raised. 27" The Arkansas
Family Council, which helped Senator Womack author the bill, sent two
delegates to testify in favor of the bill: Martha Adcock, an attorney for the
advocacy group, stated that "it was the state's business to decide what's in
the best interest of children;" Jerry Cox, the council's director, asked that if
Florida could ban homosexual adoption through Lofton, "why can't we?"' 271
Reflecting the divisive nature of the bill, the Senate narrowly passed the bill,
though not with enough votes to pass its emergency clause.272
The bill, however, met with much more opposition upon its transmis-
sion to the House of Representatives.273 The bill was assigned to the House
Judiciary Committee, which is typically more predisposed to examining the
268. Id. In part because of this clause, the bill was called "the legislative answer to [the]
Arkansas Supreme Court ruling that struck down a state policy barring homosexuals from
serving as foster parents." See Laura Kellams, Gay Foster-Parent Ban Advances Hotly Con-
tested Bill Also Bars Homosexuals from Adopting Kin, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Mar. 13,
2007.
269. Kellams, supra note 265. Compare with Howard I (noting that "[t]he General As-
sembly did not include. . . the promotion of morality in its delegation of power to the Board.
Consequently, the Board was acting outside its areas of responsibilities.") Howard II, No. 05-
814, 2006 WL 1779467, at *6. (Ark. June 29, 2006).
270. Kellams, supra note 265. Senator Argue asked Senator Womack if he was a homo-
sexual or heterosexual, and if he could prove it one way or another. Id. When Senator Wo-
mack admitted to the difficulty in offering proof that he was "proudly heterosexual," Senator
Argue then asked if the bill proposed invading the privacy of the home to discern the truth,
such as by "installing cameras in the bedroom." Id.
271. See Kellams, supra note 265. Professor Beiner rejoined that the Arkansas situation
was different from Florida's, in part because of the unanimous decision in Howard H and its
reliance upon the circuit court's finding of facts in Howard L See id. Senator Argue warned
that if the bill passed, "then prejudice and discrimination will have trumped the best profes-
sional judgment available to us." Id. Senator Womack, however, contented that professional
organizations opposed to the bill were not members of the Legislature and that "[t]he court
specifically said that this is a public-policy decision that needs to be made by the [General
Assembly]."). Id.
272. Kellams, supra note 265.
273. See Laura Kellams, Two Accused of Sabotaging Bill Measure to Ban Gays as Foster
Parents Land in Tough Panel, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Mar. 23, 2007.
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possible constitutional problems of legislation. 74 Representative Kathy
Webb typified the sentiment of many of the committee members when she
described the legislation as being motivated by discrimination and not a
desire to protect children. 275 The legislation failed to garner enough votes to
win the committee's approval, effectively ending any chance that Senate
Bill 959 would pass in the 2007 legislative session.276
III. PROPOSAL
In holding solely upon the separation of powers issue and ignoring the
substantive matters, Howard II is more significant for its subtextual implica-
tion than for its actual holding. A proper analysis of the issues from a judi-
cial federalism perspective reveals that the Arkansas Supreme Court, wheth-
er intentionally or obtusely, remained silent on the important substantive
issues at hand and left the matter to be decided by hostile political actors.277
What follows is a proposal to suggest a remedy for this lapse in the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court's typical utilization of judicial federalism.2 78 Finally, this
section concludes by examining those who are at risk as result of this depar-
ture.
279
A. The Arkansas Supreme Court Did Not Decide Howard II in Accor-
dance with Its Judicial Federalism Precedent
This section of the note will demonstrate the appropriateness of apply-
ing judicial federalism principles to Howard II. First, it will show the simi-
larity between Howard H and the other privacy cases to which the Arkansas
Supreme Court applied judicial federalism analyses. 280 Then, the note will
274. See id. Jerry Cox of the Family council accused Gov. Beebe and House Speaker
Benny Petrus of working "behind the scenes" to defeat the legislation by assigning it to an
unfriendly committee. Id. Representative Harrelson, the Democratic majority leader in the
House of Representatives, admitted that "[n]obody's happier that it went to this committee
than the governor.... That's because he won't be in the tough position of having to sign or
veto legislation he believes is unconstitutional." Id.
275. Id. Representative Webb is the only openly gay member of the General Assembly.
Id.
276. Laura Kellams, Bill to Ban Foster Care by Gays Dead-Ends in House Committee
Votes Few for State Senate-Passed Measure, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Mar. 28, 2007.
Rita Sklar, the American Civil Liberties Union attorney who primarily litigated HowardI and
II, described the committee's treatment as a "whupping." See also Meredith Oakley, Editori-
al, Bigotry Suffers a Blow, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Mar. 30, 2007 (describing the legisla-
tion's failure as a blow to "institutionalized bigotry in Arkansas").
277. See infra Part III.A-B.
278. See infra Part III.C.
279. See infra Part III.D.
280. See infra Part III.A. 1.
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conduct a judicial federalism analysis of Howard H as required by Arkansas
precedent.28'
1. Howard II was a Departure from Arkansas Judicial Federalism
Cases
Sullivan III, Griffin, Brown, Rikard, and Picado have several common
features.28 2 The plaintiffs in each case specifically sought relief under the
Arkansas constitution.283 All of the plaintiffs sought to have some form of a
privacy interest protected through the Arkansas Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of that constitution. 284 The claimants requested relief in this manner
because of the inefficient federal protection offered at the time.285 In each
case, the Arkansas Supreme Court relied upon its "rich and compelling his-
tory of protecting individual privacy" to determine whether greater individ-
ual rights should be offered through its own sovereign constitution than the
federal constitution.286
Yet the Arkansas Supreme Court chose to resolve Howard H on a sepa-
ration of powers holding despite the near identity between the applicable
law of Howard II and its preceding judicial federalism cases.287 Surprisingly,
the Arkansas Supreme Court never engaged in a judicial federalism analysis
in Howard 11, even after having "wholeheartedly embraced" it so recently in
288 A utcprevious analogous situations. As Justice Brown asserted, judicial federal
ism is concerned with the analytical process, not its result.289 Yet such a
"mature approach" to judicial federalism cannot occur if the court does not
even acknowledge that such a process exists or that it is being ignored.290
281. See infra Part III.A.2.
282. See supra Part lI.D.
283. See supra Part lI.D.
284. See supra Part IID.
285. See supra Part II.D.
286. See supra Part II.D.
287. Compare supra Part II.D with supra Part II.E. By ruling solely on separation of
powers grounds to moot the judicial federalism issues, the court's disposal gives credence to
the jaded view that "difficult cases are moot." See DAVID CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES
AND MATERIALS 77 n.3 (4th ed. 1990). Furthermore, former Justice Fogleman once decried
this practice: "the constitutional question that has arisen in the instant litigation can, and
probably will, arise again unless the issue is laid to rest. I see absolutely no point in by-
passing this main question, and withholding a decision until another day .. " Wood v.
Goodson, 253 Ark. 196, 205, 485 S.W.2d 213, 218 (1972) (Harris, C. J., concurring).
288. See Brown, supra note 61, at 507.
289. See Brown, supra note 61, at 504.
290. See Williams, supra note 102, at 888-89. This is particularly telling because the
Arkansas Supreme Court has often discussed its ability to enlarge the guarantees of the Ar-
kansas constitution, even when declining to do so, in privacy cases arising after the court
adopted judicial federalism. See supra Part II.D; see also Scott v. State, 347 Ark. 767, 786,
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Therefore, this section offers an appropriate judicial federalism analysis of
Howard 11.291 The following is an appropriate federalism analysis of Howard
II, highlighting why the substantive results proposed in Justice Brown's
concurrence should have been adopted by the Howard H majority.
2. A Judicial Federalism Analysis of Howard II
The cross-appellants in Howard I requested relief under the Arkansas
constitution to have their individual rights protected more expansively than
they would under current federal interpretation of homosexual privacy
rights.2 92 A Non-Equivalence Model analysis of Howard 11 would have ex-
panded the rights offered under the Arkansas constitution beyond the federal
Constitution. This analysis requires a comparison of Arkansas and federal
precedent on the issues as well as an examination of Arkansas's traditional
history in protecting privacy. Therefore, use of the Arkansas Supreme
Court's preferred model of judicial federalism, the Non-Equivalence Model,
is appropriate in order to protect the cross-appellants on their requested
substantive grounds.293
a. Arkansas has a rich and compelling history of protecting in-
dividual privacy
"Arkansas has a rich and compelling history of protecting individual
privacy.',294 The right to privacy is fundamental and must be strictly pro-
tected by the Arkansas government.2 95 Further, the fundamental right to pri-
vacy is penumbral, and thus encompasses several other fundamental
rights.296 Among these is the fundamental right to intimate association,
which embodies close interpersonal relationships. The inclusive fundamen-
tal right to privacy is demonstrative through the Arkansas constitution, Ar-
kansas statutes, and Arkansas case law.297
67 S.W.3d 567, 581 (2002) (Hannah, J., concurring) ("we may interpret our constitution
obviously without restrictions from other jurisdictions"); cf Welch v. State, 364 Ark. 324,
219 S.W.3d 156 (2005) (declining to expand the protections of the Arkansas constitution by
requiring police officers to advise citizens of the right to refuse consent for search of ve-
hicles).
291. See infra Part III.A.2.
292. HowardI, No. 05-814, 2006 WL 1779467, at *1 (Ark. June 29, 2006).
293. See supra Part II.D.2. The Non-Equivalence Model is the Arkansas Supreme Court
Court's preferred judicial federalism analysis, assuming that the court will continue to em-
ploy it. See supra Part II.D.2.
294. Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 632, 80 S.W.3d at 332, 349-50 (2002).
295. Linder v. Linder, 348 Ark. 322, 72 S.W.3d 841 (2002).
296. See Picado, 349 Ark. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350.
297. See infra Part III.A.2.a.
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The Arkansas constitution is rife with provisions protecting an individ-
ual's right to privacy. As a general guideline, the Arkansas constitution pro-
hibits any construction that results in the denial or delimitation of individual
rights. 29s Accordingly, the constitution also guarantees that the rights granted
therein will be provided to all citizens equally.299 Significantly, the Arkansas
constitution explicitly proscribes any action by the general assembly that
grants rights not equally available to all citizens.3"' In particular, it guaran-
tees every Arkansas citizen the right to enjoy life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness.30 ' This right is explicitly extended to matters involving privacy of
the home.
30 2
The general assembly of Arkansas has enacted a vast body of law dedi-303Thslaspoetsm asetf
cated to protecting Arkansans' privacy. These laws protect some aspect of
privacy that affects almost every aspect of Arkansans' lives, such as busi-
ness records classifications, student publications, criminal records, residen-
tial rights, consumer-bank communications, and records exempted from
release under the Freedom of Information Act.30 4 The legislature has also
promulgated rules governing the conduct of state actors to ensure that this
fundamental right to privacy is protected.30 5
298. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 29. This explicit prohibition was so significant that the drafters
further provided that "everything in this article is excepted out of the general powers of the
government, and shall forever remain inviolate; and that all laws contrary thereto, or to the
other provisions herein contained, shall be void." Id.
299. ARK. CONST. art. 11, § 3 ("The equality of all persons before the law is recognized,
and shall ever remain inviolate; nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege
or immunity, nor exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous
condition."). Put another way, "Everyone is entitled to the protection of our Constitution."
Rector v. State, 280 Ark. 385, 401, 659 S.W.2d 168, 176 (1983) (Purtle, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 988 (1984), aff'dsub nom. Rector v. Clark, 923 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1991).
300. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 18 ("The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or
class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally
belong to all citizens.").
301. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 2 ("All men are created equally free and independent, and
have certain inherent and inalienable rights; amongst which are those of enjoying and defend-
ing life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and reputation; and of
pursuing their own happiness."). Further, this right may no be limited "without due process of
law." ARK. CONST. art. II, § 8.
302. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 15 ("[T]he right of the people of this State to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue, except upon probable cause, supported by oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.").
303. Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 680, 628, 80 S.W.3d 332, 347.
304. Id. at 629, 80 S.W.3d at 348.
305. Id.
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The Arkansas Supreme Court has previously "recognized protection of
individual rights greater than the federal floor in a number of cases. 3 °6 This
recognition has typically manifested as several actionable forms of the tort
of invasion of privacy."7 Other cases have expounded upon this right, how-
ever, and typically require that great deference be given to an individual's
right to privacy when weighed against competing interests.0 8
b. The inadequate federal floor of privacy rights for homosex-
uals
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Lofton is currently the predominant
federal guideline for analyzing the privacy rights of homosexuals.3" While
the decision is not binding on the Arkansas Supreme Court, the Eleventh
Circuit is the highest court in the nation to address the issue, and several
jurisdictions have adhered to its holding, as the circuit court did in Howard
L310 The reasoning in Lofton represents a federal floor that cannot adequate-
ly address the privacy rights and needs of Arkansas's citizens.
Lofton essentially maintains that Lawrence did not announce a new
fundamental right to privacy for homosexuals.3 ' The Lofton court's opinion
was a sharply limiting interpretation of the holding in Lawrence, which the
court construed as only forbidding criminal prohibitions on private homo-
sexual conduct as violations of an individual's due process rights and not as
reaffirming a fundamental right to privacy and intimate association." 2 The
306. Id. at 631, 80 S.W.3d at 349.
307. Id. at 631, 80 S.W.3d at 349. These forms include appropriation, intrusion, public
disclosure of private facts, and false light in the public eye. Id.
308. See id.
309. See Christopher D. Jozwiak, Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children &
Family Services: Florida s Gay Adoption Ban Under Irrational Equal Protection Analysis,
23 LAW & INEQ. 407 (2005); see also Part II.E.2.a.
310. Howard1, 2004 WL 3154530, at* 12.
311. Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dept. of Children and Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1306
(11 th Cir. 2004). Further, Lofton maintains that such an interpretation could only result from
a "strained and ultimately incorrect reading." Id. Laurence H. Tribe, one of the foremost
constitutional scholars in the nation, seems to disagree: "[s]ome argue that Lawrence is mere-
ly about decriminalizing closeted consensual intimacies between same-sex partners ... This
argument, however, seems transparently weak. The Lawrence opinion not only denies that
the Court's decision was just about sex but it also goes out of its way to equate the insult of
reducing a same-sex intimate relationship to the sex acts committed within that relationship
with the insult of reducing a marriage to heterosexual intercourse." Laurence H. Tribe, Law-
rence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right'" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARv. L. REV.
1893, 1948 (2004).
312. Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1283. The Lofton majority largely based their reasoning on Jus-
tice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence ("it was Justice Scalia's suggestion that Lawrence only
overruled the rational-basis aspect of Bower's holding, but left intact is fundamental-rights
holding."), id at 1284 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissent-
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Lofton court justified its limited interpretation because it did not believe the
United States Supreme Court had sufficiently clarified the "gray areas" of
Lawrence's applicability.313 The Lofton court claimed that to do otherwise
would require an "activist approach" and instead preferred to avoid expan-
sive interpretation when analyzing fundamental rights.3" 4
Lofton further asserted, arguendo, that even if Lawrence established a
fundamental right to privacy for homosexuals, such a right would still only
be subject to rational basis review." 5 The Lofton court maintained that many
United States Supreme Court decisions involving substantive due process
are too "cryptic" to be easily interpreted. '1 6 The Lofton court concluded that
even if the dicta in Lawrence acknowledged some abstract liberty interest in
privacy for homosexuals, it did not satisfy the criteria to become a funda-
mental right.317
c. The Arkansas ceiling of privacy rights for homosexuals
This new federal interpretation, of Lawrence is wholly at odds with Pi-
cado. It denies that fundamental rights exist to protect homosexuals from
laws tailored to make them second-class citizens, and it perpetuates a dispa-
rate treatment of homosexuals. Had the Arkansas Supreme Court conducted
its precedented judicial federalism analysis, it would have discovered this
disparity and subsequently conducted a concomitant substantive analysis to
determine an appropriate outcome of Howard II under the Arkansas consti-
tution.3"8 Instead, the majority opinion ignored such an analysis altogether.
ing)), as well as a footnote from a case arising thirty-six years before that opinion ("The
Court has not definitely answered the difficult question whether and to what extent the Con-
stitution prohibits state statutes regulating private consensual sexual behavior among adults,
and we do not purport to answer that question now."), id. at 1282 (citing Carey v. Population
Srvs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5) (1977)).
313. Id. at 1285. The Lofton court adhered to this reasoning even while acknowledging
that the United States Supreme Court jurisprudence may reveal that an opposite reading in
Lawrence may be appropriate. See id.
314. Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1285.
315. Id. at 1288-89. Contra Tribe, supra note 311 at 1917. ("the strictness of the Court's
standard in Lawrence ... could hardly have been more obvious.").
316. Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1288-89.
317. Id. The Lofton court did not address what those criteria may be, or what criterion
Lawrence failed to muster. See id. at 1289-90. Further, Laurence H. Tribe alleges that such a
conclusion "requires overlooking passage after passage in the Court's opinion," such as "the
Court's declaration that it was dealing with a 'protection of liberty under the Due Process
Clause [that] has a substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining the rights
of the person."' See Tribe, supra note 311, at 1917.
318. It is interesting to note that the Howard II court made no reference to Lofton, despite
the circuit court's reliance on it. See Part II.E.2. Perhaps the court recognized that to do so
would highlight the immense difference in federal and Arkansas interpretation of homosexual
rights and omitted even a citation to Lofion in order to avoid a judicial federalism analysis.
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A proper substantive due process analysis of Howard II under Arkansas
precedent would have expanded the rights of homosexuals in accordance
with the state's prior judicial federalism principles.
Substantive due process protects certain fundamental rights that are so
entwined in tradition and history that they are "implicit in the concept of
liberty." '319 Some of these rights are encompassed within the right to privacy:
for example, the federal minimum of interpretation of due process guaran-
tees that this includes, at the very least, the right to make unencumbered
decisions relating to family relationships and raising children without undue
interference.320 These rights may not be restricted by the government without
a necessary justification that could not have otherwise been achieved.32" ' This
strict scrutiny review places an almost insurmountable burden on the gov-
ernment to demonstrate that its compelling goal can only be achieved
through the legislation that is burdening the fundamental right.322 Because
Picado established that there is a constitutionally protected right to privacy,
and the Regulation penalized homosexuals who exercised that fundamental
right by categorically excluding them from the foster parent application
process, Howard II should have been evaluated on substantive due process
grounds under a strict scrutiny review.
In Howard II, the Regulation disadvantaged a discrete group of people
because of their intimate relationships: Arkansan homosexuals were wholly
excluded from participating in the foster parent application process if they
entered into an intimate relationship with one another. Further, the Regula-
tion flatly discriminated against homosexuals on the basis of their sexual
conduct, which the Picado court concluded was subject to strict constitu-
tional protection under the fundamental right to privacy.3 23 Also, the Regula-
tion violated the minimal federal guarantees of privacy by infringing on this
group's right to make decisions regarding family and child-rearing without
undue governmental interference. Instead of respecting this fundamental
right to privacy, the Board chose instead to discriminate on that very basis
through a blanket ban that excluded homosexuals from the foster parent
application process. Indeed, as noted in Justice Brown's concurring opinion,
"nothing that the [Board] presented to the trial court shows that it had a
compelling state interest for doing what it did. Certainly, the Board's prof-
fered reasons surrounding [the] best interest of the child are gossamer thin
and have no foundation in objective research." '324 Therefore, the Regulation
319. Linder v. Linder, 348 Ark. 322, 342, 72 S.W.3d 841, 851 (2002) (citing Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)).
320. Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1304.
321. Picado, 349 Ark. at 628, 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350.
322. See id.
323. Id.
324. HowardI, 2006 WL 1779467, at *10 (Brown, J., concurring).
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violated the fundamental right to privacy under the Arkansas constitution on
dual grounds: the government's discriminatory actions burdened Arkansas's
gays' and lesbians' fundamental right to form intimate relationships because
they exercised their constitutionally protected sexual conduct.
B. Howard H Is a Blueprint for Discrimination
The Howard 11 majority provided the Arkansas General Assembly with
a set of instructions on how to perpetuate the discriminatory goal of the
Board by departing from its judicial federalism precedent. The court did not
conduct a judicial federalism analysis that would have led to a due process
examination that, under Arkansas precedent, would have offered increased
protections for homosexual Arkansans. Such a decision could shield them
from unconstitutionally discriminatory laws similar to the Regulation and
give them parity with other citizens.31 5 Even more troubling is that the ma-
jority made clear how the Regulation should be redrafted so that it could
withstand a separation of powers analysis in the future: "[t]he General As-
sembly did not include . . . the promotion of morality in its delegation of
power to the Board. Consequently, the Board was acting outside its areas of
responsibilities when it enacted [the Regulation] and was in violation of the
Separation of Powers Doctrine." '326 Thus, the Howard II Court instructed the
general assembly by negative implication that it must only include promo-
tion of public morality, no matter how discriminatory, in the Board's author-
ity.327 This outcome is almost perverse in its irony, as the Arkansas Supreme
Court has offered a way to limit rights where it once championed their ex-
pansion. While the court's reasons for doing so and discarding its judicial
federalism precedent are not easily discernible, its adverse effect is clear.328
325. The court did not do so even though its past members have made a similar mistake:
in Carter v. State, the court refused to find Arkansas's then-existing criminal sodomy act
unconstitutional and instead chose to let the legislature determine whether sodomy between
consenting adults was still condemned by society and deserving of criminalization. 255 Ark.
225, 231, 500 S.W.2d 368, 372 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974). The general as-
sembly did in fact repeal the criminal sodomy act (Act of Apr. 8, 1975, No. 928, 1975 Ark.
Acts 2463 (repealing Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-813 (Bobbs-Merrill 1947)); but when the Legisla-
ture reconvened in its next session, it drafted a new criminal sodomy act that only applied to
homosexuals (Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-122 (Michie Repl. 1997)).
326. Howard II, 2006 WL 1779467, at *6. Even those outside of the legal community
have come to this obvious conclusion, as one journalist noted that it is "still open season on
homosexuals. They're one of the last minority groups it's not politically incorrect to discri-
minate against-or at least campaign against." Kane Webb, Editorial, Mike Beebe 's Stonewall,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, July 16, 2006.
327. Howardll, 2006 WL 1779467, at *6.
328. An in-depth analysis or discussion conjecturing on the possible personal motivations
behind Howard II are beyond the scope of this note; however, circumstances that have arisen
in similar situations may be instructive. One possible reason for the decision could be the
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C. The Need for Guidance
The analytical process that is fundamental to judicial federalism and
supposedly "embraced" by the Arkansas Supreme Court must be used con-
sistently or not at all. To do otherwise weaves a patchwork precedent that
will leave practitioners at a loss as to how the court's decisions should be
interpreted.329 Further, Arkansas practitioners need to be aware of whether
the Arkansas constitution is still a viable vehicle for enlarging rights beyond
the United States Constitution, or if that federal minimum is the best that
can be hoped for.
Should a case analogous to Howard H arise again, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court would have the opportunity to conduct a judicial federalism
analysis in consonance with its prior judicial federalism cases. Further, the
court could greatly diminish the likelihood that a law similar to the Regula-
tion would be enacted by using the due process analysis proposed herein.33°
Doing so will offer homosexuals in Arkansas the level of protection they
obviously need by demonstrating that any discriminatory legislation de-
signed to hamper their rights will be judged just as if it affected any other
group of citizens, and not a member of a politically unpopular group.
If the Arkansas Supreme Court has decided that judicial federalism has
lost its utility, however, it must make that clear. If the makeup of the current
court believes that the criticisms of judicial federalism are well-founded and
that it should be permanently abandoned, it must make some clear pro-
nouncement to that effect so that the litigators in this state may prepare ac-
cordingly. Without such guidance, litigators will be at a loss as to whether
they should seek relief under the Arkansas constitution or whether their
clients have any hope of being granted expanded rights therein.
adverse political effects. The members of the Arkansas Supreme Court are elected or re-
elected by the citizens of the state at the expiration of each justice's eight-year term. ARK.
CONST. art. VII, § 6, repealed by ARK. CONST. amend. LXXX § 22. Given that Arkansas
judges are directly accountable to voters, they may be more susceptible to serve the will of
the majority in contravention of their role as a countermajoritarian branch of government as
the political spin that could be placed upon such a decision could doubtless do damage to a
justice's tenure on the bench. But cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1997) (animus may
be inferred as the only explicable basis when all proffered rationales are clearly and manifest-
ly implausible).
329. At present, Justice Brown's steadfast adherence to judicial federalism is the only
common thread to rely upon in this line of cases. See supra Part II.E.
330. Judicial federalism concurrences have, in the past, laid the groundwork for future
majority opinions that adopted the prior rights-expanding reasoning. See Scott v. State, 347
Ark 767, 67 S.W.3d 567 (2002) (Hannah, JJ., concurring).
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D. An Uncertain Future
The Arkansas Supreme Court's break with its judicial federalism
precedent puts two distinct groups at risk: the gay and lesbian community in
Arkansas as well as those children in the Arkansas foster care system. This
departure places a sword of Damocles over these groups because of the un-
certainty as to whether a member of the general assembly will be able to
craft legislation that achieves the goal of the Regulation through the implicit
guidance of the court.33' The first attempt at reviving that goal narrowly
failed with Senate Bill 959. While its proponents miscalculated by drafting
the legislation in accordance with the reasoning in Lofton, as well as includ-
ing the public policy delegation suggested in Howard II, the advocacy group
that helped author the bill has already announced plans to achieve this result
through an initiated ballot measure in 2008.332 It is interesting to note that
even though the Arkansas Supreme Court departed from its judicial federal-
ism precedent in Howard II, voter-initiated referenda such as are being
threatened by the Arkansas Family Council are commonly used to counter
judicial federalism opinions that are unpopular with a group of citizens.333
The immediate, and obvious, group at risk is the gay and lesbian com-
munity in Arkansas. They must face the very real danger that some govern-
mental action will return them to second-class citizenship, simply for enjoy-
ing their constitutional right to privacy. Although they are currently safe,
there is no guarantee that the slim victory over Senate Bill 959 can be re-
peated.
The additional, and perhaps unintended, group at risk are the children
in the Arkansas foster care system. While the citizens and elected officials
of this state bicker over the morality and rights (or lack thereof) of homo-
sexuals, thousands of Arkansas's children are part of the foster care system,
and hundreds of them have not been adopted because of a lack of volun-
teers.334 If some legislative progeny of the Regulation were enacted, that
331. This is similar to the facts that led to the Picado decision, wherein Justice Brown
recognized the need for protecting homosexuals fiom the criminal sodomy statute because it
hung "like a sword of Damocles over the heads of the plaintiffs, ready to fall at any moment."
Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 639, 80 S.W.3d 332, 354-55 (2002) (Brown, J., concurring).
332. Kellams, supra note 276. Indeed, the Arkansas Family Council has already made a
failed attempt to have such an initiated measure certified by the Arkansas Attorney Genener-
al, Dustin McDaniel. Ark. Atty. Gen. Op. 2007-248, 4 (Sept. 2007). The Attorney General
stated that he had several concerns regarding the group's effort, and rejected their first sub-
mitted measure because of its "partisan coloring." Id. at 9. The Attorney General Later certi-
fied a revised version. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2007-266.
333. See supra Part II.C.
334. Mary Bissell, Ban on Gay Foster Parents Damaging to Children, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, May 9, 2004.
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pool would become even more limited.3 ' The more disturbing consequence
of resurrecting the Regulation would be the harm to the hundreds of children
who have already been placed in homes with a homosexual foster parent and
formed stable familial relationships, who would have to be displaced into
the pool of children who have no foster home at all.336
IV. CONCLUSION
Howard H is a departure from the Arkansas Supreme Court's judicial
federalism precedent. Arkansans must now wait until the Arkansas Supreme
Court advises the state as to what jurisprudential course it is now charting. If
it is a return to the lockstep analyses of the past, then the at-risk groups dis-
cussed herein may no longer look to their sovereign state constitution as an
additional guarantee of individual rights where federal protection is lacking.
If it is a continuation of judicial federalism, then the court must act quickly
to rectify its jurisprudential lapse in Howard II and perhaps explain why its
"embraced" tradition was momentarily abandoned.
In a press release issued after Howard II, Chief Justice Hannah referred
to the Arkansas Supreme Court as the "silent partner" to child welfare agen-
cies charged with protecting children in foster care.337 Further, he noted that
"courts play a critical role in the lives of a foster child." '338 He advocated that
the foster care system should be improved to provide stability for foster
children.339 Unfortunately, such stability will not likely be achieved by pro-
viding the framework to impair an already-struggling institution through
limiting its meager volunteer base. Hopefully, the members of the Arkansas
Supreme Court can find their voice once more and return to their rich tradi-
tion of expanding individual rights rather than leave the work to be done by
those all too willing to limit those rights.
335. Yet, even if such a bill was never enacted, these children must still suffer. For those
who are fortunate enough to have a loving parent who happens to be homosexual, the child
will still be raised in a home by someone who is legally viewed as a second-class citizen.
336. See Gary Gates & M.V. Lee Badgett, Adoption and Foster Care by Gay and Lesbian
Parents in the United States, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, March 2007 at 20. For those who
believe that such a situation would be better for Arkansas's foster children, they may be more
persuaded by knowing that the cost of such a change to the Arkansas foster care system is
estimated at nearly half of a million dollars. Id.
337. Press Release, Jim Hannah, A Call to Action for Arkansas's Foster Children (July
10, 2006).
338. Id.
339. Id.
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